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depth and originality of the text, many chapters and individual passages of the Laozi refer 
to the syncretic environment of governance theoreticians, and elements traditionally con-
sidered typically Daoist can be found in texts marked as proto-Legalist, Legalist, or Real-
ist” (vol. 1, p. 43). There seems to be a remarkable tendency in contemporary Czech 
sinology to stress the “pragmatic” aspects of the Laozi.
3   –   Správná cesta in Czech. Sehnal’s Czech translations are translated into English by the 
 author of this review.
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In his new book, Sinologism: An Alternative to Orientalism and Postcolonialism, 
Ming Dong Gu critically discusses the process of knowledge production about Chi-
na and Chinese civilization. As a distinguished scholar of humanities, Gu is well 
versed in a great variety of scholarly disciplines that deal with this subject, and his 
book is therefore an important contribution to those interested in academic ap-
proaches to China. The word ‘Sinologism’ is Gu’s coinage of what is deficient in such 
approaches. As an alienated variety of Sinology, and like scientism, Sinologism ap-
pears when scholars display prejudices, biases, and other unwanted cultural hierar-
chies in their work regarding China and Chinese civilization. At the end of the book, 
Gu defines Sinologism as
an undeclared but tacitly administered institutionalization of the ways of observing China 
from the perspective of Western epistemology that refuses, or is reluctant, to view China 
on its own terms, and of doing scholarship on Chinese materials and producing knowl-
edge on Chinese civilization in terms of Western methodology that tends to disregard the 
real conditions of China and reduce the complexity of Chinese civilization into simplistic 
patterns of development modelled on those of the West. (pp. 218–219)
There is, in Gu’s words, a “cultural unconscious” at work in China scholarship, 
where China is being forced, somehow or other, into the categories of Western schol-
arship in terms of epistemology and methodology, and Gu painstakingly points out 
numerous fields and subjects where this happens, mostly in the humanities and so-
cial sciences.
However, Gu is careful not to point a finger too much at Western scholars, and 
is adamant that many Chinese scholars fall for the same trap, employing Western 
categories to understand China. Gu is also careful to distinguish between Sinologism 
on the one side, and Orientalism and postcolonial discourse on the other. While he 
998 Philosophy East & West
acknowledges that Sinologism shares some characteristics with these two, it is the 
academic orientation that separates Sinologism from the more political orientation of 
Orientalism and postcolonial discourse. Sinologism is primarily concerned with crit-
icism of academic practices, but of course Gu realizes that politics and ideologies 
play a large role in the distortion of good academic practices.
Gu’s book is an attempt to formulate, via the uncovering of the prejudices and 
biases in China scholarship, a different, alternative theory for such scholarship that 
would take China “on its own terms.” However, this theory does not really come from 
the ground, as Gu spends most of his time uncovering the Sinologistic tendencies in 
other scholars’ works. He does this eloquently, but often in a repetitive fashion. For 
example, there are numerous passages throughout the book that deal with the dif-
ference between Sinologism and Orientalism and postcolonialism in much the same 
way, making the same point again and again that Sinologism is mostly academic, 
whereas the other “isms” are mostly political in nature. Gu has rightfully felt the need 
to distinguish these in detail, but the price seems to be that the effort to develop his 
alternative theory gets stranded in the reiterated and undoubtedly right claim that 
good scholarship should be objective and disinterested so far as this is possible.
But this claim is exactly what seems to be problematic, as Gu acknowledges that 
scholarship, especially in the humanities and social sciences, is never really such. To 
solve this problem he employs Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutics to advance 
his alternative theory. Gu’s form of hermeneutics acknowledges that theories are 
never fully objective, and, in line with postmodern criticisms on such claims to ob-
jectivity, Gu argues eloquently that continued refinement and modification of the 
“prejudices” that are inevitable will lead to better interpretations of China. But in 
the end what this boils down to is really not much more than a call for the return to 
the ideal of scholarship in general. His discussions of the proposed alternative theory 
are limited to a couple of pages in the middle of the book (pp. 136–138) and a pas-
sage nearer to the end where he employs a rather facile understanding of Heidegger’s 
“pre-understanding” in terms of Vorhabe or Vorgriff (pp. 151–152).
What seems problematic for Gu’s approach is that the terminology of ideal 
scholarship is largely the same as that of those “universalists” or “objectivists” that 
Gu rightly criticizes. To his credit, Gu does seem to acknowledge the fact that an 
awareness of the shortcomings of earlier and current scholarly work is the most im-
portant catalyst for striving for the ideal of objective and disinterested scholarship, 
which he describes on pages 13–14. But this ideal is really nothing other than the 
ideal of scholarship in general and is still informed by the successes of the natural 
sciences, in terms of objectivity, disinterestedness, and being free of bias. Nowhere 
can we find exactly how the hermeneutic approach would take China really “on its 
own terms,” and Gu should have advanced more Chinese scholarly material to sub-
stantiate the idea that such hermeneutics does in fact represent China better than any 
alternative Western theory.
Another difficulty lies in the fact that Gu sometimes seems to overplay his cards. 
When, for example, he mentions traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) as not being 
allowed according to scientific standards, Gu argues that this means that either the 
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standards are wrong or that they should not be applied to TCM since such standards 
are Western biased. While comparative philosophers can sympathize with the idea 
that in the humanities and to a large extent in the social sciences such bias is indeed 
prevalent, in my opinion it is hard to argue that scientific standards as such are biased 
just because they originated in the West. Scholars or researchers using such standards 
may be prejudiced, but this does not mean that the standards themselves are. And 
sometimes Gu seems to conflate these two things. For example, he mentions (without 
references) that TCM has “clinically proven” benefits (p. 135). The fact that alleged 
TCM benefits apparently do not stand up to the rigor of blind testing, double testing, 
repeatability and reproducibility, control groups, and other objective standards of 
good science is thus discredited by Gu as ideologically motivated by those influ-
enced by the West.
Another instance of this exaggeration is when Gu criticizes, as he does through-
out the book, Chinese scholars who would deny at least some of the value of Chinese 
culture and seek to replace it with “Western values.” Gu ranks all such cases under 
Sinologism and calls this self-colonization, but seems reluctant to accept that, at least 
in some scholars, this move was seen more in terms of the self-liberation from the 
perceived vices of one’s own culture, through adopting and adapting the perceived 
virtues of another culture. This process can also happen internally within a culture, 
as when people rise up against oppressive dictators and/or religions that claim to 
be the cultural guardians, and as such should not be condemned per se by Gu, who 
after all stands for the values of disinterested scholarship, humanity, equality, and 
liberation from oppression and political domination.
The way this is relevant to Gu’s otherwise valuable contribution to the emancipa-
tion of Chinese thinking and scholarship on China is that he seems consistently to 
condemn the use of Western categories in the study of China, but sometimes uncriti-
cally uses such Western categories himself while failing to explain why these catego-
ries or his use of them would not fall under the rubric of Sinologism, or why the use 
of Western categories is always a bad thing.
In his eagerness it seems Gu at some points misrepresents the Western misrepre-
sentations, as when classing Derrida under the “Sinophiles.” Derrida’s engagement 
with China in terms of philosophy or language was almost non-existent or very 
scarce, and to rank him under the Sinophiles on the basis of two or three comments 
that were never really explored any further is optimistic at best. The same happens 
when Gu claims that the attacks on Confucianism coincide with the “large-scale 
importation of Western ideas and culture” (p. 62). Does this not deny and belittle the 
vigorous attacks by Mohists and Daoists, among others, in the times of Confucius and 
the early Confucians themselves? Throughout the book such exaggerations distract 
from its main and laudable topic.
So much for the criticism, because with Sinologism we have both a timely and 
valuable contribution to the emancipation of China studies, as well as a renewed 
wake-up call to scrutinize any academic contribution to China studies, and that very 
much includes our own. Sinologism does provide this wake-up call, but should have 
employed its scrutiny more consistently to itself.
